Let's keep asking #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar and offering the People of Myanmar support in their fight for liberation.
I wrote the Karenni Refugees section of the blog back in August and September, over a month before I actually published the site. This included a section where I provided some historical context for the war in Myanmar. When I caught up to the present day I wrote:
"The coup sent the message to the people of Myanmar that the Tatmadaw [the Burmese military] cannot be worked with. Whatever appetite for fighting there was in the country, it was certainly lower and far less universal in 2020 then it is now. There remain divisions between the [Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)] but the level of coordination is overall the highest it has ever been. This coupled with the influx of new recruits means that unless (or until) anything major changes, it is effectively impossible for the Tatmadaw to win. They have already lost control of over half the country (though they were never in control of some of these areas to start with). This isn’t to say they are likely to lose however. Taking Naypyidaw or Yangon from the junta will require a herculean effort or a serious fracturing amongst military leadership. They also have the advantage of retaining international recognition."
A lot has changed. Estimates vary on how many air strikes the Tatmadaw have carried out but it is certainly increasing. One estimate puts the number for the first four months of 2023 at 442 which would match the total from the entirety of 2022. The military doesn’t have the forces necessary to take and secure towns so has instead resorted to indiscriminate strikes to try and break the spirits of civilians. Schools set-up by the Civil Disobedience Movement are often targeted in retaliation for the 10 million students across the country who, alongside their teachers, boycotted the Junta’s education system following the coup.
The air strike campaigns are not working. Morale amongst the EAO’s is increasing while the military has been beset with defections. On October 27, Operation 1027 was launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance — a coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army — in the North of the country. The US Institute of Peace has deemed the operation as involving “unprecedented coordination,” between EAOs. The result has been a “stunning success,” which has galvanized other groups around the country to step up their attacks on Tatmadaw positions. Over 150 of these have been abandoned and in the Northern Shan State there have been at least 400 surrenderees including the entirety of the Light Infantry Battalion 143. On December 4th, reports came out that Mone, the first town in Bago which could be considered the Tatmadaw’s heartland, was seized. These gains have not gone without notice. The Guardian’s editorial team came out last week stating that they see the military’s control over the country to be tenuous. They warned against the international community from giving the Tatmadaw any support in the case that they offer up some sort of ‘compromise’ like replacing top General Min Aung Hlaing. The BBC reported that “the military is looking weak, and possibly beatable.” While the Council of Foreign Relations warned that the US should no longer continue to assume that the military will eventually be able to negotiate peace. The resistance fighters around the country have no incentive to do so.
None of this means that a swift military defeat is imminent. Much fighting is likely to remain on the horizon. The chance of a victory for the people of Myanmar has risen substantially in the last month however. The road out for the Tatmadaw continues to be leveraging their international legitimacy. Strikingly, observers believe that China likely gave tacit approval to the Three Brotherhood Alliance as they become increasingly disillusioned with the Junta leadership. India has continued to work with the Tatmadaw though, and ASEAN members have allowed for the passage of aviation fuel through their ports. Inexplicably, aid organizations have also continued to funnel supplies and money through Yangon where the military can skim contributions for themselves and prevent any from going to areas outside of their control.
The West can put more pressure on regional governments in these areas to limit both civilian casualties and the Tatmadaw’s power. We must also start to send aid through border areas so local administrators can distribute it. Many of these groups, like the Karen National Union and Karenni National Progressive Party have decades of governance experience and are more than capable of distributing aid. And finally, we should prepare for a future in Myanmar where the military is out of power. This will not solve all of the country’s problems. The impacts of their rule and Bamarization programs will have to be dealt with. This will be difficult but with hope of the Tatmadaw out of the way, I join the people in Myanmar in dreaming of a better future.
