Supporting Karenni Refugees
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From September of 2022 until the end of March 2023 I spent my weekdays living and working within the Ban Mae Surin (also known as Karenni Site 2) refugee camp in the remote jungles of Thailand’s already-remote Mae Hong Son province. I was there as an education advisor for the Karenni Leadership College (KnLC), the only post-10 school — students are aged 16-24 — serving the community of around 2700 people. This experience, unsurprisingly, changed my life, but this blog is going to have 200 stories at least partially about me- so this one is about them, and how we can hopefully help change their lives too. If you're not interested in the background scroll down or click to "The Goal - Creating a Scholarship for KnLC Graduates. If you're already ready to donate you can do so here.
Karenni Leadership College and Ban Mae Surin
Refugee camps are not usually associated with fairs but each year the students of the Karenni Leadership College put on a three-day event to fundraise for their school. Save for one foreigner — me — all of the attendees are fellow residents of the camp. Booths are made of bamboo and prizes are simply free ‘play agains’ but the atmosphere is unmistakable. For one, it is busy. And two, people are spending generously. This is remarkable in and of itself. Thailand never signed the 1951 UN Declaration on the Rights of Refugees. This means that residents are officially not allowed to leave the camps or work. In practice there are minor exceptions. Working on or within close proximity to camp is fine. But salaries are unsurprisingly low. Teachers at the school make 2500 baht (about 70 CAD or 95 USD) a month for reference.
And yet for those three days people keep coming. They buy food prepared by the students. They line up to kick a soccer ball at distance through an old tire propped up with bamboo. They buy tickets to vote on the singing and dancing competitions. And they donate. Altogether 30 000 baht is raised.
The Karenni Leadership College does not have a major donor. Nearly the entire budget is covered by the local community and diaspora. Small donations are made by non governmental organizations when their own budgets permit. Last year myself and The Mercy Syndicate raised 60 000 baht (2300 CAD, 1700 USD) selling calendars; enough to give the teachers a 500 baht a month raise. Hopefully this will just be a start.
The community cares deeply about education. And what an extraordinary community it is. Every year KnLC hosts a week-long Leadership Camp in late February. The teachers and students head out to one of the National Park’s in the jungle and set-up camp. We had a documentary filmmaker join us this year. I told her in advance that even in just a week, the experience would have a powerful impact on her. It took two days. She expressed to me later how silly she felt giving a teary eyed speech about the welcome she had received and the spirit of everyone present less than 48 hours after introductions. But I understood perfectly. Really, few things I’ve ever experienced have ever made so much sense.
By the time I will have completed the 200 stories promised here I will have written well over 300 000 words. But I suspect I will never be able to find the right combination to capture the true definition of community. It is beyond my abilities as a writer. It simply has to be experienced, and KnLC might be the only place on Earth to do so.
Education is important for another reason: it provides a difficult but plausible route out of camp. If someone wishes to leave there are currently three options: third-country resettlement, returning to Myanmar and education. All of these are difficult prolonged processes.
Third-country resettlement means moving to a place like the United States, Australia or Canada. To do so requires a United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) registration number followed by a multi-year vetting process checking their employment and affiliation background as well as their health records. Individuals with higher education credentials get through quicker, contributing to a “brain drain” in camp further increasing the importance of KnLC. The Thai government has not allowed the UNHCR to do registration since the late 2000s fearing that this would act as a ‘pull-factor’ bringing more people in from Myanmar at a time when the conflicts across the border were waning. It appears that the UNHCR will be able to resume registration next year as a result of the worsening situation in Myanmar for those who have been in camp since 2019. For those without this registration the other option is family reunification if they have direct relatives who managed to resettle earlier. This takes even longer as backlogs are considerable. One of my good friends in camp who is fully fluent in English has been waiting since 2017 for his application to be processed and likely has another 3 years ahead of him.
Throughout the 2010’s returning to Myanmar was an option pursued by many members of the community. Democratic elections were held in 2015 and the Karenni Army signed the first cease fire in 55 years with the junta in 2012. This was not as simple as returning home. The camps have existed since the mid 90s so many people have lived their entire lives across the border in Thailand. For those who are older many of their villages have been burned down by the Burmese military (part of an awful strategy known as ‘four cuts’ which I will expand upon in the Conflict in Myanmar section), so they would be returning to scarred land. Regardless, this option is simply not possible now. The 2021 coup and resulting civil war have made returning incredibly dangerous. Air strikes along the border pushed around 5500 people to the Karenni Site 1 camp back in July.
The education route involves a number of steps. After graduating from KnLC students have to apply for the chance to get their Thai GED. This is a competitive one-year program as there are, to my knowledge, only two schools accepting students from the nine camps. It’s very intensive as students have to achieve high English test scores to be able to apply for universities in Thailand or abroad afterwards. At this step cost is the most prohibitive factor. They are Burmese nationals so even those born in the camps in Thailand have to pay international tuition prices. There are numerous scholarships aimed specifically at refugees from Myanmar but still far less than needed to meet the demand. I know a former KnLC graduate who has been accepted 3 separate times but has narrowly missed out on receiving a scholarship.
The Goal - A Scholarship for KnLC Graduates
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My dream for this blog and its attached shop is to one day be able to fund a university scholarship specifically for KnLC graduates. The students there face an even harder challenge than those at many of the other camps. There are nine camps along the border with Myanmar. Seven are ethnically Karen (pronounced ‘cah-ren’) with the northern two being Karenni. The Karen due to their much larger size, proximity to major population centres, and historic connections to international organizations have far more resources at their disposal than the Karenni do. All of the high schools in the seven southernly camps finish with the conclusion of twelfth grade. Whereas in the two Karenni camps grade 11 and 12 are only being introduced in 2024 and 2025 respectively.
What limited resources are available to the Karenni leadership are sent disproportionately to Site 1. NGOs also serve the much larger population there with greater frequency as it is only about 40 minutes from Mae Hong Son the provincial capital, and about 15 minutes from the town of Nai Soi.
The last time KnLC graduates were able to attend university was in 2018. COVID and the loss of quality educators to third-party resettlement have certainly played a role in this. But the availability of resources and access to support has undoubtedly contributed to this problem. Using the Karenni National College in Site 1 as a comparable it is reasonable to expect that the number of graduates pursuing their GED should be about three times higher. I worry that this option looks increasingly out of reach for students which may act as a disincentive towards studying. It also hurts the community as a whole as many university graduates find work with NGOs and the Karenni Progressive Party providing invaluable insight and expertise.
My hope is that a dedicated scholarship for KnLC graduates can help close the resource gap and provide further motivation to continue on with their studies. I know many of the current students well and know that they can achieve remarkable things given a little bit of support. Now this is no small feat. International tuition fees are often around 220 000 baht a semester. That’s about $17000 Canadian or $12500 American a year.
If you want to help make this scholarship a reality you can send a one-time or recurring donation to my ko-fi. 100% of it will be put towards this goal. Additionally all proceeds from any shop items (coming soon!) depicting camp or the people in it will as well. Thank you for your support of refugee education. If you are not in a position to donate or make any purchases I still very much appreciate you reading and taking the time to learn about this small but incredible community.
Who are the Karenni People?
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Karenni is a collective term for the groups who have historically inhabited the mountainous region between the Karen and Shan regions of what is today Myanmar. The Karenni States were a collection of principalities who first became independent in the 19th century. The British recognized this independence in 1875 and never formally incorporated them into their colonial possessions in Burma though they did become a vassal state in 1892. [1]
When Burma gained independence in 1947 the Karenni and Shan states were given a constitutional provision allowing them to secede following ten years. [2] This was never granted and pro-independence leaders were assassinated by military police as early as 1948.
On the map to the right (below on mobile) you will see that the Karenni state is listed as ‘Kayah’. Kayah people are the most populous Karenni ethnic group, making up an estimated 56% of the population of the Karenni state (you have to go back to 1983 to find a reliable census so this number may be wildly inaccurate now). These name changes have long been a tactic of the Burmese junta to try and sow division amongst those resistant to their rule. [3] As such I continue to use Karenni as the state identifier as well as Karen instead of ‘Kayin’ as all those I have encountered in the camps and in Canada prefer these names. It is likely that the change of the country’s English name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 was similarly motivated. [4] This name change has stuck more with the people I know.
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There are an estimated 250 000 Karenni people in the world. Most are Christian with small Buddhist and Animist minorities. About half of the population resides in Karenni state with the rest primarily in Thailand, the US, Australia and Canada. 2800 people live in Ban Mae Surin and 8000 in Karenni Site 1. This does not include the roughly 5500 people who arrived seeking assistance after their Internally Displaced Persons camp was bombed by the junta in July.
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For those who would like to know more I can recommend the documentary Like We Don't Exist.
Further Background: Conflict in Myanmar
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Modern Burma was founded as a racial hierarchy state. [5] Britain seized the territory that is today Myanmar through three wars with the Konbaung Dynasty. The first in 1824, the second in 1852 and the last one, only two weeks long, in 1885. The territory was run as a province of British India until 1937 with separate administrative systems split along ethnic lines. The lowland areas, where most of the majority Bamar population lives were placed under direct rule whereas the highland ‘frontier areas,’ had local leadership who reported to the British similar to the princely states in much of the rest of British India.
So-called ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial’ races was another idea the British developed in India and ported over to Burma. This racist theory went that some ethnic groups were dumber but braver and thus more suited to combat whereas others were more intelligent but cowardly and thus naturally subservient. In Burma the Karen, Kachin and Chins were given the title of martial and they were largely used to man the internal army used to control the directly administered lowlands. [6] It’s divide and rule all the way down.
During World War 2 ethnic Bamars founded the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) and fought alongside the Japanese against the British. Frontier Area groups remained loyal to allied forces pitting them against the BIA. Disillusioned with the Japanese occupation the BIA switched sides in March of 1945, but the ethnic grievances stemming from the colonial period and World War 2 between the various lowland and highland groups have never been resolved. [7]
Myanmar is host to the world’s longest running conflict. The country gained independence from the British in 1948. A few months later in early 1949 the Karen National Union began fighting the Tatmadaw (the Burmese military) for independence. Throughout the 50s and 60s various other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) would join the war, including the Karenni National Progressive Party’s armed wing in 1957. Over the decades some of the demands have changed, notably calls of independence have been replaced by a vision of a federal system. But the fighting has never ended. There have been ebbs and flows as ceasefires have circulated around from state to state only to be broken when resources allowed for it. The Karen and Karenni have been some of the staunchest in their resistance, signing their first ceasefires only in 2012 –- that is after 63 and 55 years of continuous fighting respectively! — following a campaign of liberalization by the military dictatorship.
In 2015 free and fair elections were held (though the military is guaranteed autonomy, 3 key ministries and 25% of seats in the 2008 constitution) that were won overwhelmingly by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party. Throughout this whole period civil liberties increased drastically but a peace agreement was elusive. The NLD have been criticized for being naive to the complexities of these decades long conflicts. [8] While talks stalled, fighting continued in the Northern Shan State and sectarian strife exploded in Rakhine. This was followed by an ethnic cleansing campaign by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya Muslim minority and a full-scale insurgency by the Buddhist Arakan Army.
On February 1, 2021 the Tatmadaw dismissed the civilian government in a coup on baseless claims of electoral fraud. The reaction from Myanmar’s people was swift. Protests broke out immediately and a campaign of civil disobedience spread through the country. As many as 750 000 civil service members (¾ of them) walked off the job, truckers refused to deliver goods to the Yangon port and traffic jams were created on purpose to limit the ability of military officials to get around. These are just a few examples; basically any form of peaceful and disruptive behaviour that could be imagined was tried. With the military refusing to back down and at times resorting to force to disperse protestors, ceasefires began to fall apart. The trust the Tatmadaw had built up, however precarious, in the previous decade evaporated. University students abandoned their studies and joined EAO’s or newly created People’s Defense Forces, determined to end military rule in the country once and for all.
The fighting has been brutal. Over 200 000 people were displaced in 2021 in the Karen and Karenni states alone. [9] The Tatmadaw has long used a horrific strategy of “four cuts” which aims to stop any flow of food, intelligence, recruits and funds between civilians and armed groups. To do so villages are given evacuation orders, often with less than 24 hours of notice, after which the military decrees they have the right to shoot on sight as they destroy the village and any food stocks left behind. [10] Soldiers then regularly return to these areas to dissuade anyone from rebuilding their homes. Villagers are forced to choose between relocating their town to a more off-the-radar location, moving to “Su See” or “gathering villages” on the outside of larger urban centres where they can be monitored more easily, or if possible, flee to refugee camps in neighbouring Thailand or Bangladesh. These tactics have been deployed since the civil war began. There have also been numerous allegations of arbitrary detainment, torture and rape by the junta. The stability of areas under resistance control is always threatened by the Tatmadaw’s monopoly on air power.
We in the international community should be prepared for a prolonged human rights crisis in Myanmar. The current conflict is not likely to end anytime soon. The coup sent the message to the people of Myanmar that the Tatmadaw cannot be worked with. Whatever appetite for fighting there was in the country, it was certainly lower and far less universal in 2020 then it is now. There remain divisions between the EAOs but the level of coordination is overall the highest it has ever been. This coupled with the influx of new recruits means that unless (or until) anything major changes, it is effectively impossible for the Tatmadaw to win. They have already lost control of over half the country (though they were never in control of some of these areas to start with). This isn’t to say they are likely to lose however. Taking Naypyidaw or Yangon from the junta will require a herculean effort or a serious fracturing amongst military leadership. They also have the advantage of retaining international recognition. The announcement of upcoming elections are seen as a way of trying to gain legitimacy in the eyes of foreign governments who may not have many ideological misgivings about engaging a junta and are already looking for an excuse to do-so.
[1] Kramer, Tom, Oliver Russell, and Martin Smith. From War to Peace in Kayah (Karenni) State: A Land at the Crossroads in Myanmar. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2018, 13.
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[2] Kramer, Russel and Smith, From War to Peace in Kayah (Karenni) State, 15.
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[3] Kramer, Russel and Smith, From War to Peace in Kayah (Karenni) State, 16.
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[4] Myint-U, Thant. The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, And The Crisis Of Democracy In The 20th Century. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2020, 44.
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[5] Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma, 5.
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[6] Tin Muang Muang Than. “Ethnic Insurgencies and Peacemaking in Myanmar,” in ISEAS Perspective: Selections 2012-2013, edited by Ooi Kee Beng. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2014, 106.
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[7] Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma. This is generally the thesis of the whole book which I found to be excellent and persuasive.
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[8] Kramer, Russel and Smith, From War to Peace in Kayah (Karenni) State, 47.
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[9] The Border Consortium. Working With Displaced People: Annual Report 2021. Bangkok: TBC, 2022, 3.
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[10] Kramer, Russel and Smith, From War to Peace in Kayah (Karenni) State, 89.